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RICO: The Controversial 
Congressional Definition 
of "Racketeer" 
W hen people think of racketeers they tend to think of persons involved in an organized illegal 
activity such as murder, arson, bribery, or 
extortion. An imaginative person might 
conjure up clandestine schemes such as 
white slave trafficking or smuggling con-
traband cigarettes. But since the early 
1980's the list of persons being labeled 
racketeers does not include so much the 
average Al Capone and John Dillinger 
types, or criminal cartels and "Mafia" or-
ganizations. In stark contrast, prominent 
and respected accountants, I attorneys,2 in-
vestment bankers3 and other professionals 
are being charged with "racketeering ac-
tivity." 4 Rather than La Cosa Nostra or the 
Black Hand, the list of "racketeering en-
terprises" 5 defending suits under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO) 6 is made up of 
highly reputable businesses like Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells, Lloyd's of London and 
Shearsonl American Express. 7 
RICO was passed by Congress in 1970. 
The principle purpose of the statute was to 
halt and prevent the "infiltration of orga-
nized crime and racketeering into legiti-
mate commerce." 9 Congress felt it could 
effectively fight organized crime by strip-
ping the "Mafia" of the profits it derived 
from infiltrating legitimate businesses.9 
For many years "gangsters" have con-
trolled legitimate businesses using their 
racketeering reputation and skills to earn 
high rates of return on their investment of 
time and capital. 10 A racketeer might ac-
quire an interest in a legitimate business 
for many reasons. Generally racketeers 
seek to diversify their activities and in-
crease their assets using legitimate enter-
prises to launder their money and protect 
their wealth. 
The economic principals of the criminal 
enterprises are sound, although the meth-
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ods suggest a few antitrust violation issues. 
In some instances they would create mo-
nopolies, at other times cartels, or the 
racketeers would simply make the legiti-
mate entrepreneurs in a particular indus-
try an offer they could not refuse. RICO 
armed the government with new and con-
troversiallegal avenues to pursue criminal 
and civil convictions for this type of illegal 
activity. 
However, today when this "four letter" 
acronym is invoked in litigation it intro-
duces a staggering level of anxiety into the 
highest courts, the largest law firms and 
the most prestigious boardrooms in the 
country. The big business anxiety levels 
are not as a result of ties or links to orga-
nized crime and criminal activity, but 
rather are related to the civil remedies. 
Section 1 964(c) of the Act provides civil 
remedies, separate and distinct from the 
criminal remedies under RICO, for indi-
viduals injured in their businesses. 11 To 
invoke the civil provisions of the RICO 
statute, a plaintiff must allege that the 
(1) person (2) employed by or associated 
with an enterprise engaging in interstate 
commerce (3) conducts or participates in 
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise 
(4) through a pattern (5) of racketeering ac-
tivity.12 The definition of "racketeering 
activity" under the statute includes not 
only murder, kidnapping, gambling, ar-
son and numerous other crimes, but also, 
mail fraud and wire fraud. 13 Furthermore, 
a "pattern of racketeering activity" is de-
fined as two or more acts of racketeering 
activity committed within ten years of 
each other. 14 If an individual is successful 
in a civil RICO suit, that individual may 
recover treble damages and the cost of the 
suit, including reasonable attorneys fees. 15 
Many RICO commentators feel this type 
of recovery, not normally available in sim-
ilar causes of action, represented "the 
dangling carrot" that sparked most of the 
controversial litigation in areas far afield 
from the perceived domain of the racketeer. 
What essentially has happened is that 
"garden variety type" 16 business disputes 
have been converted to RICO claims by al-
leging two or more counts of mail and/or 
wire fraud. The scope of mail and wire 
fraud is so broad that literally any commer-
cial business transaction may fall into this 
dubious category. All that need be alleged 
is the use of the mails or telephones to exe-
cute or further a scheme to defraudY 
The defendant does not even have to ac-
tually mail or wire anything ifit is foresee-
able that mailing or wiring may be used. IS 
Additionally, the "fraudulent scheme" does 
not have to involve money or property, but 
need only be a departure from the ever elu-
sive "good faith business dealings" stan-
dard - "a departure from 'fundamental hon-
esty' or 'fair play and candid dealings. '" 19 
A 1985 American Bar Association study 
on civil RICO actions reported that the 
predicate acts of mail and wire fraud ac-
counted for approximately seventy-five 
percent of all the civil RICO actions pend-
ing at that time.20 Many studies as well as 
the courts have recognized the potential 
for abuse under the mail and wire fraud 
provision of the statute. 21 On the other 
hand, as was stated by the Second Circuit 
in Furman v. CimOto,22 "[fJraud is fraud, 
whether it is committed by a hit man for 
organized crime or by the president of a 
Wall Street brokerage firmo"23 
Supporters of the civil RICO provisions 
say consumers are often legally impotent 
victims of increasing business fraud and 
bad faith dealingso 24 Consumer groups ap-
plaud the opportunity to turn a civil cause 
of action that was traditionally an uphill 
battle at the state level into a powerful fed-
eral case under RICO.25 Critics of RICO 
say disappointed or an~ered clientele, and 
jealous or unscrupulous competitors are 
the civil RICO plaintiffs. 26 There seems to 
be a thinning line of demarcation between 
"good ole" business practices of closing a 
"sweet deal" or driving a hard bargain and 
claims of fraud, misrepresentation, and 
manipulation under RICO. 
Corporate officers worry that the normal 
activities of a successful enterprise-in-
creased earnings and expansion through 
smooth sales representatives, enthusiastic 
brokers, polished marketers and active ac-
quisition departments-can bring RICO 
litigation down on an unsuspecting busi-
ness without justification. Public interest 
groups argue that the only way to cease 
fraudulent business activities is to present 
big business with the threat of treble dam-
ages under a civil RICO suit. 27 
The business community criticizes RICO 
arguing that a civil conviction carries the 
criminal stigma of a conviction for "racke-
teering, " thereby causing prudent business 
persons defending such suits to settle a 
case with no merit to avoid this stigma or 
ruinous media exposure. 28 Ironically, the 
RICO plaintiff is said to have extortive 
purposes of simply wrestling large in ter-
rorem settlements out of the deepest pock-
ets they can find. 29 
The business community claims the label 
of racketeer raises many questions and 
poses significant problems for business. 30 
One issue that concerns the business com-
munity is whether the government would 
use this label of "racketeer" as a basis for 
surveillance or to set up information gath-
ering grand jury investigations. There is 
also concern that corporate officers and 
principals of particular industries would 
be branded with the label of "racketeers." 
Another issue is whether legitimate busi-
ness people would wish to avoid acquiring 
an unsavory reputation that might come 
from being associated with an industry 
tainted by "racketeering activity." 31 CEO's 
suggest that the label racketeer hampers a 
company's ability to carry on business, in 
that it creates a lack of desire for financial 
institutions, accounting and law firms to 
extend their services for fear of doing busi-
ness with wrongdoers. 32 
On the other hand, consumer groups 
argue that business fraud is rampant and 
" ... civil RICO is an 'indispensable co~ 
sumer protection statute,' " providing "re-
lief from financial muggings and white 
collar criminals." 33 Public interest groups 
and state and federal prosecutors point out 
that, " [l]ack of vigorous enforcement against 
'white collar' crime shakes the public's 
faith in the efficacy and fairness of our 
criminal justice system." 34 Robert Blakey, 
a Notre Dame law professor and Chief 
Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee that 
proposed RICO, noted that "the business 
community criticized the Securities Act of 
1933 and the antitrust laws, charging that 
the statutes would halt capital formation, 
prolong the Depression, and ruin business, 
in much the same way it now criticizes 
RICO." 35 
The recent wave of civil RICO suits 
started in 1980. Of the cases decided be-
fore 1985, three percent were decided be-
tween 1970 and 1980. Conversely, two 
percent were decided in 1980, seven per-
cent in 1981, thirteen percent in 1982, 
thirty-three percent in 1983, and forty-
three percent in 1984.36 By 1984 civil 
RICO suits had been filed in nearly every 
area of the law, including securities law, 
both sides oflabor union disputes, class ac· 
tion torts, and even domestic disputesY 
The ABA RICO Report revealed that 
out of 270 cases, twenty had been filed 
against attorneys and accountants, with 
another forty cases concerning securities 
brokers. The ABA RICO Report also noted 
that of the 270 cases, forty percent involved 
securities fraud and thirty-seven percent 
common law fraud in a commercial or 
business setting. 38 
Attorneys have been named as defendants 
in RICO litigation primarily for rendering 
routine professional advice in stock trans-
actions or partnership offerings. 39 Some 
people believe it is aggressive plaintiff at-
torneys searching out new causes of action 
who are responsible for this onslaught of 
civil RICO claims. Senator Strom Thur-
mond, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee stated, "[RICO has been] ... 
perverted by fertile legal minds." While 
this writer would not hold plaintiff at-
torneys totally responsible, they have been 
under fire and many judges have not ex-
actly welcomed the RICO plaintiff's cre-
ativity. 
A number of judges have recognized the 
potential for abuse apparent within the 
statute. As a result courts have begun to 
judicially constrict the RICO provisions. 
Some courts read into the statute that the 
plaintiff must allege a separate and distinct 
"racketeering injury" aside from one of the 
predicate acts enumerated under the stat-
ute. 40 Other courts required that the de-
fendant must have been convicted of a 
previous RICO violation. 41 Still other 
courts have held that neither the previous 
conviction or separate injury were require-
ments. 42 The inconsistent holdings cre-
ated serious difficulties for defense at-
torneys trying to advise their clients on 
how to avoid or respond to civil RICO 
litigation. 
The Litigation Section of the American 
Bar Association and the Corporation and 
Business Section combined their resources 
polling their memberships of about 100,000, 
seeking the opinions of RICO litigators on 
the expansion of the field and any legisla-
tive changes that should be sought. 43 The 
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) began 
to publish a Civil RICO Reporter; Com-
merce Clearing House (CCH) published a 
RICO Business Disputes Guide; and the 
U.S. Department of Justice published a 
RICO manual for federal prosecutors. 
In the midst of the confusion and con-
troversy surrounding RICO and the split 
among the United States courts of appeals, 
the Supreme Court stepped in. The U.S. 
Supreme Court endorsed the civil RICO 
cause of action with its holding in Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.44 Sedima was de-
cided by the Court to resolve conflicting 
decisions among the courts of appeals and 
to clarify the congressional intent of RICO. 
Sedima, a Belgian corporation, had en-
tered into a joint venture with Imrex, an 
American corporation. Sedima took orders 
from Belgian companies for electronic 
components. Imrex would then obtain the 
components in America and ship them to 
Sedima in Europe. The two companies 
agreed to split the profits. As the venture 
proceeded Sedima became convinced that 
Imrex was presenting inflated bills and 
declaring nonexistent expenses, thus si-
phoning off the profits. Sedima filed suit 
in New York, alleging breach of contract, 
unjust enrichment and RICO violations 
based on mail and wire fraud. 
The district court dismissed Sedima's 
RICO claims for failure to allege a distinct 
"racketeering type injury." The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 
based on the failure to allege a "racketeer-
ing injury," and additionally, found the 
complaint defective for not alleging that 
the defendants had already been convicted 
of a RICO violation. 45 
In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court held 
that: "(1) there is no requirement that a 
plaintiff in a private action establish a 
"racketeering injury", as opposed to an in-
jury resulting from the predicate acts of 
the statute; and (2) there is no requirement 
that a private action can proceed only 
against a defendant who has already been 
convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO 
violation." 46 The Court was not impressed 
by the concern that "legitimate" persons 
and businesses were being attacked under 
the statute. 47 
After determining Congress intended to 
reach "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enter-
prises when it passed RICO, Justice White 
said, "[legitimate businesses] ... enjoy 
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal 
activity nor immunity from its conse-
quences." 48 Justice White stated further, 
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It is true that private civil actions un-
der the statute are being brought al-
most solely against such defendants, 
rather than against archetypal, intimi-
dating mobster. Yet this defect - if de-
fect it is-is inherent in the statute as 
written, and its correction must lie 
with Congress. It is not for the judici-
ary to eliminate the private action in 
situations where Congress has pro-
vided it .... 49 
The Supreme Court accepted the idea 
that Congress had created a "Frankenstein" 
in civil RICO saying " ... RICO is evolv-
ing into something quite different from 
the original conception of its enactors." 50 
The Court also charted a new course for the 
lower courts to take, suggesting that the ap-
propriate judicial action is the development 
ofa " ... meaningful concept of pattern." 51 
In Sedima's famous "footnote 14" the Court 
acknowledged that "the definition of a 'pat-
tern of racketeering activity' differs from 
other provisions in section 1961 in that it 
states that a pattern 'requires at least two 
acts of racketeering activity.' "52 The Court 
then implied that the two acts necessary to 
satisfy the statute may not be sufficient by 
stating " ... in common parlance two of any-
thing do not generally form a 'pattern.' "53 
The distinct message from the Supreme 
Court, as per footnote fourteen, is "[t]he . 
legislative history supports the view that 
two isolated acts of racketeering activity do 
not constitute a pattern." 54 Many of the 
legitimate businesses caught in the RICO 
web have been subject to pleadings that 
cite two isolated acts of racketeering stem-
ming from one event or transaction. 55 
With the holding in Sedima, the RICO de-
fense counsel can use the pattern require-
ment as a new battleground. 
While Congress has yet to act and the 
courts, after Sedima, are now beginning a 
slow process of adding judicial gloss to 
RICO, many states have taken it upon 
themselves to pass state RICO statutes. 
These state statutes, twenty-four to date, 
vary immensely in scope and applicability. 
Some' of the statutes have eliminated a pri-
vate right of action while others have added 
provisions for injunctive relief and punitive 
damages. The states that have enacted 
RICO statutes are Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Is-
land, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 56 
A RICO bill was introduced in the Mary-
land House of Delegates in January 1986, 
but was killed by the Maryland House Ju-
diciary Committee. 57 The proposed bill 
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had a purpose of increasing the Attorney 
General's ability to prosecute large scale 
criminals. It would have given the state the 
ability to seize all profits from activity de-
fined as "racketeering" under the law. 58 
Under the proposed bill, a pattern of racke-
teering would have been established by at 
least two occurrences of racketeering that 
have the same or similar circumstances 
within a five year period. 59 The Maryland 
proposal actually broadened the civil side 
of the statute hoping to restore any lost 
consumer and investor confidence as a re-
sult of the impact of the savings and loan 
crisis. 60 
The Maryland House Judiciary Com-
mittee thought the Maryland RICO bill 
was too broad and encompassing. 61 The 
The Maryland 
proposal actually 
broadened the civil 
side of the statute 
hoping to restore 
any lost consumer 
and investor 
confidence . . . 
committee declined the invitation from 
Maryland RICO sponsors to use the bill as 
a menu and choose the provisions it ap-
proved of. Instead the committee killed 
the RICO bill and declared that the com-
mittee would review the sections of the 
Maryland code that deal with forfeiture 
provisions to develop a bill that served the 
same purpose. 62 
The sponsors of the Maryland RICO 
bill, that was modeled after federal RICO, 
had hoped that the committee would 
amend and revise the bill to conform to 
Maryland's needs. However this task is 
easier said than done. Aside from the at-
tractive remedies and broad categories of 
activities prohibited, the federal RICO 
statute is laden with ambiguities. The 
most glaring ambiguities concern the pro-
cedural issues presented within the statute. 
With respect to personal jurisidiction, 
section 1965 of the Act allows nationwide 
service of process wherever the person 
"resides, is found, has an agent, or trans-
acts his affairs." 63 Some courts have held 
that with nationwide service of process, 
due process for the defendant requires 
only that a defendant have minimum con-
tacts with the United States. 64 Conversely, 
some courts have held the RICO provision 
to mean due process for the defendant re-
quires minimum contacts with the forum 
state. 65 
Section 1965(b) provides a "co-con-
spiracy" theory of venue, allowing asser-
tion of venue over "other parties" if venue 
is already established over at least one de-
fendant. This section has been used by 
courts to serve and join parties over whom 
venue would ordinarily be improper, if 
" ... the ends of justice so require ... ."66 
For actions brought by the United States, 
section 1965(c) allows witnesses to be 
served with subpoenas in any judicial 
district. 
For criminal violations of RICO the 
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 67 However, the civil RICO claim 
raises a question as to whether the ordinary 
civil burden of proof, a preponderance 
of the evidence, standard applies. Most 
courts have followed the preponderance of 
the evidence standard, but the ABA and 
others have suggested that in light of the 
heavy penalties for civil violations a higher 
burden of proof should be applicable. 68 
The alternatives suggested by the ABA are 
adopting a beyond a reasonable doubt or 
clear and convincing evidence standard. 69 
In dicta, the Supreme Court in Sedima in-
dicated a "preponderance standard" seemed 
proper. 70 
RICO provides a five year statute oflim-
itations on the criminal side, but there is 
no statute of limitations for civil actions 
provided in RICO. Courts have applied 
several approaches toward determining 
whether a civil RICO claim should be 
barred by the statute oflimitations. Most 
courts look to the most closely analogous 
state statute of limitations with respect- to 
the offense involved. 71 However, choice of 
law questions, concerning which state law 
to supply still cloud the issue. Other courts 
look to the pseudo statute oflimitations in 
section 1961(5) that requires two acts of 
racketeering activity, " ... one of which oc-
curred after the effective date of this chap-
ter and the last of which occurred within 
ten years . . . after the commission of a 
prior act of racketeering activity." 72 
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure has been called the RICO plain-
tiff's pitfall. Strict interpretations of the 
rule have put the burden on the plaintiff 
to plead with particularity alleging time, 
place, specific content of fraud, the iden-
tity of persons making alleged misrepre-
sentations and the consequences of the 
scheme. Some courts have given a more 
liberal construction to Rule 9(b).73 An 
Illinois district court held a skeleton RICO 
complaint as sufficient that pleaded " ... the 
bare bones of the fraudulent scheme .... " 74 
The Illinois court also noted that the 
amended complaint ''will never be ac-
cepted as a model pleading" under RICO. 75 
As far as discovery goes, one court noted 
"[a ]mong other things, a defendant may be 
exposed to pretrial discovery of every as-
pect of its business for a ten-year period." 76 
Another consideration under RICO is 
collateral estoppel. A defendant in a crim-
inal or administrative action must consider 
the legal effect of a judgment or settlement 
of those claims on subsequent civil RICO 
claims. Pursuant to section 1964(d) a final 
RICO judgment or decree in favor of the 
U.S. in a criminal proceeding " ... shall 
estop the defendant from denying the es-
sential allegations of the criminal offense 
in any subsequent civil proceeding brought 
by the United States."77 It is likely that 
where a successful government action is 
followed by a private RICO claim, the un-
successful defendant will be subject to an 
offensive use of collateral estoppel. Thus, 
a defendant may be barred from relitigat-
ing the same issue in the private action. 78 
Collateral estoppel has been used defen-
sively in RICO cases as well. Previous civil 
litigation has precluded relitigation of is-
sues in a RICO case where an investor's 
RICO claim failed because it involved the 
same transactions and issues of fraud in-
volved in a previous securities fraud claim 
that had been adjudicated adversely to the 
claimant.79 
There are other questions not resolved 
under RICO pertaining to equitable relief 
and arbitration. Section 1964(a) gives fed-
eral courts the authority to grant equitable 
relief, but Congress was silent with respect 
to private actions.8o Section 1964(b) cate-
gorically empowers the Attorney General 
with the ability to obtain injunctive relief, 
but again Congress made no reference to 
private plaintiffs. 81 
There have been split decisions in RICO 
cases concerning securities and commodi-
ties fraud where there are arbitration 
clauses present in the contracts involved.82 
The recent judicial trend is to rule that 
RICO cases are arbitrable. In jurisdictions 
where the RICO cases are not arbitrable, 
courts are tending to stay litigation of the 
non-arbitrable claims for reasons of judicial 
economy pending the arbitration of the 
other claims that were asserted. In earlier 
decisions the courts reasoned that RICO 
claims could not be arbitrated because of 
the important federal interest in enforcing 
RICO.83 
Congress is well aware that it is time for 
a change in RICO. There are currently 
several bills in the House and Senate.84 
The bills address a myriad of subjects in-
cluding, requiring a prior criminal convic-
tion of a predicate act, modifying the pred-
icate acts requirement relating to mail and 
wire fraud, adding penalties for frivolous 
RICO claims, defining "pattern" more 
precisely, redefining "enterprise", adding 
a new substantive offense relating to orga-
nizing, financing, controlling or partici· 
pating in a "criminal syndicate", changing 
the name of the act, providing a statute of 
limitations, applying a higher standard for 
burden of proof in civil actions, and pro-
viding equitable relief in private civil 
actions. 85 
Support for amendments to civil RICO 
has come from, inter alia, the ABA, the 
criminal defense bar, accountants, bank-
ers, securities professionals, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the SenateJu-
diciary Committee, insurance companies 
and other businessmen. The opposition 
has been led by state attorney generals, 
public interest groups, district attorneys, 
state securities administrators, the FDIC, 
some of the original proponents of the bill, 
and until recently the Justice Department. 
As this article was being written the J us-
tice Department reversed their position on 
RICO. Although the Justice Department 
was originally opposed to any amendments 
to the statute, their new position is in favor 
of amending the statute.86 
At the request of Congressman John 
Conyers (D-Mich), Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Jus-
tice, business coalitions and public interest 
groups held meetings and attended hear-
ings in an effort to reach a compromise. As 
this article goes to press the House Judici-
ary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice 
passed a compromise bill that would 
amend RICO.s7 
The bill would change the name of the 
statute from "RACKETEER INFLU-
ENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANI-
ZATIONS ACT" to "PATTERN OF 
ILLICIT ACTIVITY ACT". The terms 
"illicit" or "criminal" would be substituted 
in provisions of the act where "racketeer-
ing" now appears. Section 1964(c) which 
currently provides for a civil action with 
recovery of treble damages and the cost of 
the suit, including reasonable attorney's 
fee for any violation of section 1962 would 
be subject to the most changes. 
The new section 1964(c) would have six 
provisions. Subsection (1) would only al-
Iowa civil action against an individual who 
knowingly violates section 1962 and limit 
the recovery to actual damages. Subsec-
tion (2) would allow the federal and state 
governments or any agency or corporation 
thereof to bring a civil action against an in-
dividual who knowingly violates section 
1962 and recover treble damages for the 
injury the government sustained. Subsec-
tion (3) pertains to corporations, and pro-
vides corporate liability if an officer, di-
rector, partner, or employee knowingly 
violates the statute within the scope of his 
duties and was authorized by an executive 
officer or ratified by the governing board 
of the corporation. Furthermore, the con-
duct in violation of the statute must have 
been intended to benefit and did benefit 
the corporation materially. Subsection (4) 
provides a three year statute oflimitations. 
Subsection (5) addresses actions alleging a 
predicate act based on fraud, providing 
that the plaintiff must establish the exis-
tence offraud by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Finally, subsection (6) instructs the 
court to award a prevailing plaintiff a rea-
sonable attorney's fee. 88 The proposed 
legislation is still far from adoption and 
therefore the current civil RICO provi-
sions, with the endorsement of the Su-
preme Court, prevail. 
In this writer's opinion the current civil 
RICO provisions must be changed. Legiti-
mate businesses were not the intended 
subjects of civil RICO prosecution and 
should accordingly be absent from the de-
fense tables in civil RICO litigation. I re-
alize that by proffering this position pro-
ponents of civil RICO, who would uphold 
the current provisions, might consider me 
a cold and callous individual, who would 
cavalierly disregard the rights of victimized 
consumers in the furtherance of the inter-
ests and profits of white collar criminals. 
However, the majority of legitimate busi-
nesses prosecuted under RICO are just 
that -legitimate businesses, not white col-
lar criminals. Furthermore, victimized 
consumers have many remedies in the 
courtroom without resort to civil RICO. I 
agree with Justice Marshall's dissent in 
Sedima, where he declared, in light of the 
fact that" [0 ]nly 9% of all civil RICO cases 
have involved allegations of criminal ac-
tivity normally associated with profes-
sional criminals .... The central purpose 
that Congress sought to promote through 
civil RICO is now a mere footnote." 89 
Ironically, as Congress contemplates 
changes to civil RICO provisions federal 
prosecutors in New York are beginning 
two of the most significant trials in the his-
tory of organized crime in the United 
States. In 1985 the Justice Department 
handed down an unprecedented series of 
indictments affecting seventeen of the 
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twenty-four Mafia families in the U.S.90 
The Justice Department is pursuing its 
cases against the five New York crime 
families under the criminal provisions of 
RICO. Justice Department officials con-
fess to using the civil provisions of RICO 
only ten times against organized crime 
figures, but vow to follow up recent con-
victions with private civil suits. 91 
In Sedima, Justice Marshall's dissent de-
scribed the majority's interpretation of the 
civil RICO provisions as revolutionizing 
private litigation, saying " ... [the Court] 
validates the federalization of broad areas 
of state common law of frauds, and it ap-
proves the displacement of well estab-
lished federal remedial provisions." 92 
This writer feels that the civil RICO pro-
visions have revolutionized private litiga-
tion, not as a result of the Supreme Court's 
holding in Sedima, but rather a result of 
the enactment of RICO in 1970. 
The underlying purpose of the civil 
RICO provisions was to strip the Mafia of 
its profits and to stop organized crime 
from infiltrating legitimate businesses.93 
The Mafia earned at least 26 billion in 
1985 and today literally controls many 
unions and labor intensive industries such 
as building construction, restaurants, trans-
portation, and clothing.94 Time magazine 
published figures estimating that "[o]ut of 
a formal oath - taking national Mafia mem-
bership of some 1,700, at least half belong 
to the five New York clans, each of which 
is larger and more effective than those in 
any other city."95 
To this writer it seems the civil RICO 
plaintiff with a fully equipped arsenal of 
treble damages, criminal stigma, media ex-
posure and recovery of attorneys fees is 
waging war in New York. However the 
battles are not being fought in Mafia terri-
tory, at the loading docks on the waterfront 
or in the garment district or at unfinished 
construction sites, instead somehow the 
civil RICO plaintiff missed the target com-
pletely and ended up on Wall Street. 
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